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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPFAT S
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«N. .is. .i *.

•-

,. ;:;i v mi hi> attorney^ lici/bx rcprie.s u- ihc

State's Brief of Appellee, dated April I I, ^H!1), In cloii)r so. Moll reasserts Ilk" nrgiiiiicnls
and authorities presented in the initial Brief of Appellant, and makes the following
additional pomi - ym\ u.n 11 u itions. Any argument not specifically addressed herein is not
\\< aiv eel,,

•

•

ii iiti.il b u d " of Appellant

In sum, and based upon Ihe cniislilulimul prinupk's .md .nilhonlies srl IIinfIIIi h u v m
and in the Appellant's opening brief, Holt requests two types of relief from this Court: (1)
an order requiring the State to c o m p l y ^ ifh ih: terms o n h e plea barizain in stipulating to a
••

•

'•

court to consider a motio

-.iMi; ,u\i\
. *

At • xicj ; iitii rizing the district
'f * r!

reduction statute in effect at the umc Huh negotiated ioi, and entered into, In- iea
bargain with tl K > i ate
ARGUMENT
I.

APPI JCATION Or i u E 2006 AMENDMEN I TO UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-3-402, IN A WAY AS TO PRECLUDE RELIEF FROM PROMISES
MADE AND RELIED UPON iN A CRIMINAL PLEA BARGAIN;
VIOLATES HOI T ' S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AMOUNTS TO
AN IMPERMISSIBLE EX POST FACTO APPLICATION OF THE LAW
AND AN IMPERMISSIBI ,E TAW IMPAIRING TIIE OBI JGATION OF
CONTRACTS,
A.

Due Process And Fundamental Fairness b ' Implii iiliril In Tin Mea
Bargaining Process,

i he Suite indicates that the appellant has not made a "due process" argument apart
from

:i

. •\i • •v

mpairmeni o contracts claims set forth below. See Brief of
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'• ;te !.

.

•

.

., ,.:,•*., ..»u-,. done so m Uia* ilie general concept of

fairness and due process permeates llir i\ IK »lt plen bai n,4iinnj> process,

1

While the concept of due process and fundamental fairness are inherent in the
concept of plea bargaining, the appellant discusses "due process*" in more detai
through-out the "remedies" section of the Brief of Appellant in discussing the remedies
available ^ *l-*h '*•• *he State's branch r4 the plea bargain. Sec Brief of Xppeik ;ii at

26-32.
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As set liiiili in I hi; appellant'^ opening I >riol. plea bargaining is an essential
foundation

of the criminal msnee svstem. Sec c.v ^f '

s)

t • /'••.'

- * 5.

However, the necessary functions of the plea bargaining process "presuppose fairness in
securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor." Santobello

v. Afew York, 404

I I.S 257, 261 (1971) (emphasis added) • -^equei itl> becau.se a criminal defendant's
underlying "contract right" in plea bargaining is eoiislifudoinJk based in Ilit ill le piueess
guarantee of fundamental fairness, and possibly, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, the government is righ.tfu.lly held to a, higher standard and a greater
degree ^*v-p< - ij

•

•*«. n.

,-nw, ng . . ^ l u r g a m x X-c State v.

Patience, 944 1\2J j<Sl, 387 (Utah *
Ai.eoi'dingh. when a prosecutor fails to uphold the bargain it has made with a
criminal detenuaia ;hc prosecutor not only violates the contract principles involved, but
ch le to tl leundei lyii ig constiti ltioi ml i igl its affoi ded a ci ii niiial defendant , the prosecutor
also violates the fundamental concepts of ii te pi ocess and fail i less in negotiating w ith tl le
defendant and securing the waiver of many of the defendant's rights as a result of the
bargain. See Brief of Appellant at 28-29 (quoting State i > Kay \ 71.7 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986) and noting tl lat' the c oi u t s 1 lavel lad to i esoi t to i lotions of f undamental fairness
under the due process clause to construct some necessin \ iv-. i <-.

-t

n,

:

,<,'

legitimate interests"). Indeed, a criminal defendant's right to due process and fundamental
2

See Brief of Anprllanl .il l-l h»: > » o 4 ,
4
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fairness "construct some necessary protections for the defendants' legitimate interests"
when entering into plea bargains with state prosecutors. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1302. As
such, when a state prosecutor breaches a plea bargain, the guarantees of due process and
fundamental fairness are absolutely implicated, and that breach must be remedied in an
attempt to make the defendant "whole." What that remedy is, in this case, is the issue
before this Court.
B.

The Ex Post Facto Clause Is Implicated.

The State asserts that the 2006 Amendment neither altered the definition of Holt's
offense, nor increased the penalty for it. Therefore, the State concludes that the Ex Post
Facto prohibitions are not violated. See Brief of Appellee at 16-23. This Court should
hold otherwise.
Despite the State's contentions to the contrary, § 76-3-402 is not a statute
describing a civil remedy (such as statutes providing for expungement or sex offender
registration), but is a statute specifically addressing the level of a criminal conviction

3

See Brief of Appellee at 18-22.
The State's analogy of the reduction statute to expungement provisions is
unavailing as the policy reasons behind the differing statutes are distinguishable. The
State asserts that allowing offense reductions for these sex-specific crimes place children
in danger because, parents or potential employers may not be able to determine a person's
criminal history if the offense is a misdemeanor. See Brief of Appellee at 22-23. The
State concludes, therefore, that "eliminating reductions advances public safety by alerting
the public to the risk of sex offenders in their communities.. .as that risk is reflected by
the classification that the legislature has assigned to their offenses." Brief of Appellee at
22 (internal punctuation and quotations omitted).
To the contrary, however, the level of offense in no way bars employers,
5
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and the attendant punishments relating to that degree of conviction. This statute clearly
allows a defendant facing criminal punishment to seek a "lesser penalty" in one of two
ways: first, by asking the court to reduce the conviction at the time of sentencing and
impose penalties accordingly and within the confines of the lesser offense level, or
second, to wait until the terms of probation have been completed in order to show
"rehabilitation," so as to justify the reduced level of offense. If the second option is taken,
"probation" of some form is contemplated in order for a defendant to prove he is worthy
of the lower level of offense. In this case, the lowered offense would be to a
misdemeanor, and the ongoing punishments attached to felony convictions would
dissipate (such as the loss of voting rights, possession of firearms, possible international
travel, etc.).4 Indeed, "a guilty defendant who is considered worthy of a reduced sentence
should receive all the advantages that go with such leniency." State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d
238, 244 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting cases).

neighbors, or others, from determining whether a person has been convicted of a sex
offense-all they need to do is look for that type of conviction, whether it be a felony or a
misdemeanor. Indeed, the level of offense plays no role in the State's public safety
argument, since a conviction still exists on the person's record, and other statutes passed
by the legislature relating to expungement and sex offender registration determines what
those level of convictions "mean" and how they may be used.
4

While ongoing penalties and restrictions associated with "felonies" would dissipate,
those special continuing prohibitions concerning one convicted of specified "sex
offenses" would not. Cf. State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 244 (Utah App. 1995). In this way,
the legislature is seemingly able to pass civil type legislation (such as sex offender
registration) relating to specified sex offenses, whether at the felony or misdemeanor
level.
6
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The 2006 amendment to §76-3-402, if applied retroactively then, increases the
magnitude of the punishment for Mr. Holt and other similarly situated defendants who
have been convicted of sex offenses, and aggravates his offense because it deprives him
of the opportunity for a reduction of his convictions and attendant consequences, which
induced him to enter his pleas. Moreover, and as noted above, prior to the amendment, a
person convicted of a "sex crime" was able to seek a "lesser punishment" by lowering the
offense level both at the time of sentencing (thus requesting that the court actually
sentence the defendant to a lesser punishment) or upon the successful completion of the
terms of probation. In this way, the punishment for the crime at issue has been altered
since the statutory ability to seek and obtain a lower offense level (again, whether at the
time of sentencing or thereafter) has been prohibited. This scenario thus directly falls
under the bans provided by the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Utah and Federal
Constitutions. See U.S. Const. Art. I § 9 cl. 3; Constitution of Utah, Article I § 18;
State v. Marshall, 81 p.#d 775, 778 (Utah App. 2003).
C,

The "Impairment of Contracts'5 Clause Is Implicated.

Finally, the State argues that the 2006 Amendment does not violate the
constitutional "contracts clauses" that prohibits legislation from impairing the obligation
of contracts. See Brief of Appellee at 23-32. This Court must again reject the State's
arguments.
1.

The Issue Has Been Properly Briefed.

7
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Initially, the "contracts clause" argument set forth in appellant's opening brief
contained citation to authority, reasoned analysis, and is more than mere "bald assertions"
leaving the burden of research to the Court. Accord Utah R. App. P. 24; State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (reviewing court entitled to have issues clearly defined
with pertinent authority cited and is not depository in which appealing party may dump
burden of argument and research).
Specifically, the opening Brief of Appellant clearly sets forth the relevant law
regarding plea bargaining and the application of contract principles to the plea bargaining
process. See Brief of Appellant at 14-16. Thereafter, the appellant also sets forth the
relevant legal authority regarding the constitutional prohibitions regarding the "impairing
the obligations of contracts." See Brief of Appellant at 18-19. Finally, the Brief of
Appellant provides reasoned analysis as to why the retroactive application of the 2006
Amendment to § 76-3-402 impermissibly impairs the obligation of contracts, specifically,
plea bargains. See Brief of Appellant at 21-23 (arguing that the 2006 amendment
impermissibly impairs the obligations of those plea bargains made between prosecutors
and defendants prior to the amendment taking effect). The appellant has properly
developed this argument and has fully complied with his briefing requirement, and this
Court must reject the State's contention otherwise. See Brief of Appellee at 23-24.

8
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2.

The Amended Statute Impairs the Obligations and Enforcement
of Contractually Based Plea Bargains Made Prior to the
Amendment.
a.

The Contract Between the State and the Appellant has Been
Impaired.

The State contends that the constitutional contracts clauses are inapplicable
because there is a lack of a contract in which to enforce. The State reasons that the
"defendant had no contract with the court" and therefore, because the "defendant cannot
show any contract with the court respecting a reduction, he cannot show that the
amend-ment to section 402 impaired any obligation of contract." Brief of Appellee at
26-27.
The State misses the point. Admittedly, there was no binding contract with the
Court.5 The existing contract at issue occurred between Holt and the State.6 However, the
amendment to the reduction statute impaired the obligations of the parties to the contract
by not only seemingly prohibiting the prosecutor from fulfilling his obligations, but by
prohibiting a court from considering the request, and further, from enforcing the
prosecutor's obligations under the plea bargain made. See, Cohen v. United States, 593
5

This case does not involve a "binding" plea pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(h).
6

The State acknowledges that a contract existed between the State and Mr. Holt.
See Brief of Appellee at 30 ("The only agreement defendant had was an agreement with
the State").
9
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F.2d 766, 772 (6 Cir. 1979) ("touchstone of Santobello is whether the prosecution met
its commitment and not whether the court would have adopted the government's
recommendation").
In this contract, the State prosecutor promised that he, on behalf of the State of
Utah, "agrees to a two-level reduction of the offenses from a second degree felony to a
Class A misdemeanor"-thus, the State agreed that it would stipulate to a reduction in the
level of offense by two degrees. What the amendment to the reduction statute did, then,
was impair not only the contractual plea bargain and the associated duties and obligations
agreed upon between the State prosecutor and the appellant, but it impaired the
enforcement of that contract by seemingly disallowing a trial court from even considering
the stipulated motion and agreed upon term of the plea bargain. Consequently, there is a
contract in this case that has been impermissibly impaired by the amended statute.
b.

Because the Plea Bargain Was Statutorily Authorized When
Entered, the Appellant's Constitutional Rights Are Paramount
and Trump the Amended Statutory Provisions.

The State next asserts that even if there was a contract, it cannot now be enforced
because the offense reduction is now "illegal." See Brief of Appellee at 27. In making this
argument, the State dismisses the principle that especially in the criminal realm, a
defendant's constitutional rights to fairness and due process in the plea bargaining
process (among others) may trump statutory law. See, e.g., State v. Louis, 645 So.2d 1144,
1148 (La. 1994) ("Contractual principles may be helpful by analogy in deciding disputes

10
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involving plea agreements. However, the criminal defendant's constitutional right to
fairness may be broader than his or her rights under contract laws.

.. .commercial

contract law can do no more than serve as an analogy or point of departure, since 'plea
agreements are constitutional contracts.' ") (emphasis added).
As noted in the opening Brief of Appellant, several courts have noted that in
enforcing terms of a criminal plea bargain between a defendant and the government,
specific performance may be ordered by a court even though it is in conflict with the
statutory law. See Brief of Appellant at 31 (citing cases). This is so because due process
dictates such a result and a "Defendant's constitutional right[] under plea agreements take
priority over statutory provisions." State v. Miller, 756 P.2d 122, 123 (Wash. 1988).
Indeed, the State's position absolutely disregards Mr. Holt's federal and state
constitutional rights and the paramount importance universally given them by both
federal and state appellate courts. See, e.g., American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140
P.3d 1235, 1243 (Utah 2006) (the Utah Constitution "is the 'original and supreme will' of
the citizenry, and 'a superior, paramount law' that fixes the boundaries of power granted
to the branches of state government"). See also, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391
(1947)("the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the
land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people, anything in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding") (internal citation omitted); Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 331 (1941)(reversing state court conclusion that habeas corpus

11
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relief based on rights guaranteed by federal constitution is unavailable under Nebraska
law, and stating, "That [federal] Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and 'Upon
the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and
enforce every right secured by that Constitution'"); Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679,
685 (1877)(federal constitution is supreme law of the land and is as much a part of the
law of every State as its own local laws); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 348 (1855)("no
one can deny that the constitution is supreme.. .and the judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding") (internal citation omitted).
Based upon this well-established foundation that constitutional rights are
paramount, it is not surprising that legislative enactments are often trumped by an
individual's constitutional rights. Common examples of this include exceptions to
statutorily-based privileges, rape shield laws, and other statutory rules applicable to
preliminary hearings and trials. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974)
(defendant must be allowed to confront and cross-examine juvenile witness to show bias
despite state statute prohibiting use of juvenile records and protecting juvenile
anonymity); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967)(defendant denied Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor by state
statute prohibiting accomplices in same crime from being introduced as witnesses for
each other); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53-62 (1987) (per se state rule precluding

12
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criminal defendant from presenting post-hypnosis testimony violated defendant's
constitutional right to testify on own behalf).
Consequently, for Mr. Holt's federal and state due process rights to remain intact,
the State must be compelled to keep its side of the bargain in this case. The State cannot
now willfully refuse to keep its promise since due process and fairness trump the
application of the amended statute in this case. Indeed, based on due process and the
interests of justice, the State's promise must be fulfilled, and likewise, the trial Court
must be given the opportunity to enforce that agreement and determine a stipulated
motion for reduction based upon the law in effect at the time the plea bargain was
entered. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

7

See also, e.g., State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 128 (Hawaii 2003)("when a statutory
privilege interferes with a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine,.. .the
witness' statutory privilege must.. .bow to the defendant's constitutional rights"); People
v. Adamski, 497 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Mich. App. 1993)("It appears well settled as a matter
of constitutional law that common-law or statutory privileges, even if purportedly
absolute, may give way when in conflict with the constitutional right of
cross-examination"); State v. Payton, 954 So.2d 193, 195 (La. App. 2007)("defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial may outweigh the State's statutory authority [to enter
a nolle prosequi and reinstate the charge] under the circumstances of any given case");
Commonwealth v. Herrick, 655 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Mass. App. 1995)(based on proper
showing, "defendant's constitutional right to put forth his full defense outweighs the
interests underlying the rape-shield statute"); Amos v. Dist. Ct. Mayes County, 814 P.2d
502 (Okla. Cr. 199l)(statutory provisions cannot deny defendant's access to confidential
yet exculpatory information); People v. Kowalski, 196 Cal.App.3d 174 (Cal. App.
1987)(defendant's constitutional right to counsel prevails over statutory right to
preliminary hearing within ten days).
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3.

The State's Obligation "Vested55 at the Time of the Entry of the
Plea.

Finally, the State claims that Mr. Holt had no "vested right" to a reduction of his
sentence, and as such, the 2006 amendment did not impair any obligation of the plea
bargain. See Brief of Appellee at 28.8 In doing so, the State defines the point of vestiture
as the time period wherein Holt could request his reduction-once his probationary terms
were completed. Holt, on the other hand, looks to the time period in which the actual
promises and obligations were incurred and where consideration was exchanged-the time
the plea bargain was entered and accepted by the court. At this point, even though there
were conditions outstanding, the State's obligation to fulfill its promises had "vested" and
Holt acted to his detriment in reliance upon those promised obligations.
In looking at this argument within the context of criminal plea bargains and the
due process right to fairness that encompasses that context, Holt's right to have the State
fulfill its obligations did vest at the time he entered into his plea, and under the law all
parties relied upon. As the United States Supreme Court long ago acknowledged:
The sound and true rule is, that if the contract, when made,
was valid by the laws of the State as then expounded by all
departments of the government, and administered in its courts

8

The State also asserts that Holt had "constructive notice" that the reduction statute
could be amended, and cites State v. Shipler as authority. See Brief of Appellee at 27-28;
State v. Shipler, 869, P.2d 968 (Utah App. 1994). The inapplicability of State v. Shipler to
the current case has been dealt with at length in Holt's opening brief, and will not be
reiterated herein. See Brief of Appellant at 23-25.
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of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by
any subsequent action of legislation...
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 206 (1863).
Moreover, and as noted in the appellant's opening brief, the contracts clauses
"protect[] contractual obligations in existence at the time the disputed legislation is
passed." George v. Oren Ltd, & Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 1983); Brief of
Appellant at 18. The purpose of the contract clause is not to protect future contracts, but
those contracts existing prior to the enactment of the challenged statute. See Beehive
Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial Com 'n, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978). As such, the
contracts clauses prevent "impairment" by a changing of the laws after a contract has
been made. See id.
Accordingly, because the State's obligation existed at the time the plea was
entered, because the State's obligation was based upon the prior offense reduction law,
and because the trial court accepted the plea under these obligations and under the law
existing at the time of the plea, the 2006 amendment has improperly impaired the contract
in this case as it has changed, and eliminated, the contractual obligation of at least one of
the parties. Moreover, the 2006 amendment also unconstitutionally impaired the plea
bargain in terms of its enforcement as it now proscribes the trial court's consideration of
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the obligations incurred by the State previously.9 Such improper application of the 2006
amendment must be remedied.
II.

HOLT IS ENTITLED TO SOME REMEDY FOR THE STATE'S FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE PLEA BARGAIN, INCLUDING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THE TERMS OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN.
Based upon the constitutional rights at issue in this case, what Holt initially seeks

is both specific performance on the part of the State (the State stipulating to a two-level
reduction) as well as acknowledgment that under these circumstances, the trial court has
the lawful authority to consider the stipulation for a reduction under the law in effect at
the time the plea was negotiated, entered, and accepted by the trial court.
Alternatively, Holt is clearly entitled to some remedy for the State's failure to
abide by its plea bargain, as suggested in previous briefing. As a last resort, this Court
must allow Holt to withdraw his plea. Holt requests that he not be forced to undergo post
conviction procedures even though he did not attempt to withdraw his plea prior to
sentencing nor attempt to appeal his underlying conviction. Accord Utah Code Ann.
§77-13-6. An exception should be made since the reason Holt did not seek withdrawal of
his plea (or appeal of his conviction) is due to his reliance on the State's promises

9

The United States Supreme Court notes:
The obligation of a contract includes every thing within its
obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more
important than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of
its vital existence...

Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 600 (1877).
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pursuant to the plea bargain. The State's failure to abide by the terms of the bargain did
not occur until well after the time period for a plea withdrawal. Accordingly, due to the
State's breach of the plea bargain and because this breach occurred through no fault of
Holt, one remedy, withdrawal of the plea, should be considered and ordered, if this Court
finds it applicable, despite the timing of the breach. Cf State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah
App. 2004 ) (discussing whether proper remedy for breach of plea bargain is withdrawal
of plea or specific performance).
Again, while Holt asks this Court to consider alternative remedies, such
alternatives will not, and cannot, make Holt whole for the disregard of his constitutional
rights and for his good faith reliance on the promises made by the State of Utah. In this
respect, Holt requests this Court fashion a remedy that does not condone the State's
disregard.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and the points and authorities set forth in the opening
Brief of Appellant, this Court must order specific performance and compel the State's
stipulation to a two-level reduction to Holt's offenses of conviction. In doing so, this
Court must also hold that the district court has the authority to consider and grant the
two-level reduction under the 402 reduction statute in place at the time Holt negotiated
his plea bargain and entered his plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June 2009.
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW
ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO
Attorneys for Appellant
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